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I. INTRODUCTION
"Computers are increasingly being used to monitor and/or
control complex, time-critical physical processes or
mechanical devices, where a run-time error or failure could
result in death, injury, loss of property, or environmental
harm." [Leveson 1986] As the use of computer software in
weapons systems grows, computer scientists and system
engineers are now faced with the difficult and unsolved
problems concerning the safety of software used in these
systems
.
There are increasing requirements for building
safety-critical systems and the military is establishing
standards that must be met for safety in these systems . Such
standards as MIL-STD-882B, MIL-STD, 1574A, MIL-STD-SNS already
include software related requirements, such as software-hazard
analysis, and verification of software safety. Such techniques
as software fault tree analysis, software sneak analysis, and
Petri net analysis are listed in MIL-STD-882B Notice 1 of 1
July 1987 as techniques available to perform software safety
analysis
.
The question is whether the software engineering community
is ready to respond to these requirements for software safety.
Current software reliability enhancing techniques and software
reliability models do not satisfy these requirements. New
techniques and approaches are needed, along with new
perspectives and emphasis.
This thesis will briefly investigate alternative
techniques to perform this type of analysis, but then focus on
if the requirements of these standards can be met by using a
Petri net methodology. The objective of this thesis is to
investigate the feasibility of using Petri nets to model and
analyze real time systems and if it is found feasible to
propose a usable methodology for performing this work. Nancy
Leveson of the University of California - Irvine has proposed
the use of Petri nets as a modeling tool and has provided a
set of techniques to perform software safety analysis on the
model. This thesis work is the first known application of the
technique proposed by Leveson. For more information on the
work done by Leveson the reader should see [Leveson 1986;
Leveson and Stolzy 1987]
.
The system under evaluation is a mechanical safety arming
device for a guided missile mechanical fuze. Microprocessors
now control arming and firing of fuzes, weapon release,
navigation and control of missiles. In the system analyzed,
in an attempt to save cost in manufacturing and improve
reliability, a microprocessor and software are replacing part
of a safety arming device that was previously mechanical.
Microprocessors allow for expanded control in addition to
added capability with less space and weight [Mclntee 1983]
.
This thesis begins with a discussion of what software
safety is and what it isn't. Then the motivation for using
Petri nets is discussed and alternative techniques are
reviewed. This discussion includes various techniques that
have also been considered to perforin this analysis and ones
that have been tried in the past. That is followed by the
theory and modeling technique of Petri nets to model a
real-time system. Then the actual real time system is
defined. Then the methodolgy used to perform the analysis is
discussed, followed by the results of the analysis and
recommendations for further research.
II. INTRODUCTION TO SOFTWARE SAFETY
A. SOFTWARE SAFETY DEFINED
Safety is usually considered to be a part of either
reliabilty or security. In order to adequately address the
specific requirements of safety, safety must be considered a
separate area. There are some aspects of software safety that
are unique with respect to current software engineering
concepts. Leveson [1986] argues separate consideration of
safety allows special emphasis and separation of concerns on
how decisions are being made. To ensure that the final system
is safe, it is necessary to make explicit any trade-offs that
involve safety. Safety requirements should be separated and
identified and responsibilities should be assigned. [Leveson
1986]
1 . Reliability versus Safety
Safety and reliability are often equated, especially
with respect to software, but the concepts, though related,
are not the same. Reliability is usually defined as the
probability that a system will perform its intended function
for a specified period of time under a set of specified
environmental conditions. Safety is the probability that
conditions that can lead to a mishap (hazards) do not occur,
whether or not the intended function is performed [Ericson
1981; Konakovsky 1978; Leveson 1986] . In general, reliability
requirements are concerned with making a system failure free,
whereas safety requirements are concerned with making it
mishap free. Reliability is concerned with every possible
software error, whereas safety is only concerned with those
that result in actual system hazards. Not all software errors
cause safety problems, and not all software that functions
according to specifications is safe [Ericson 1981] . Severe
mishaps have occurred while something was operating exactly as
intended, that is, without failure [Roland and Moriarity
1983] . [Leveson 1986]
System requirements can be separated into those
related to the mission and those related to safety while the
mission is being accomplished. For munitions, reliability is
the probability of detonation or functioning of the munition
at the desired time and place, while safety is related to
inadvertent functioning, so there is no direct relationship
[Leveson 1986] . Procedures to increase the ability of the
weapon to fire when desired may increase the likelihood of
accidental detonation, unless the design of the munition is
modified to improve the safety as the reliability increases
[Roland and Moriarity 1983]
.
Leveson and Stolzy [1987] have argued that there is a
need for a completely different approach to safety problems,
that is, an approach that is complementary to standard
reliability techniques and focuses on the failures that have
the most drastic consequences. "Even if all failures cannot
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be prevented, it may be possible to ensure that the failures
that do occur are of minor consequence or that, even if a
potentially serious failure does occur, the system will
fail-safe." [Leveson and Stolzy 1987] Fail-safe procedures
attempt to limit the amount of damage caused by a failure and
there is no attempt to satisfy the functional specifications
except where necessary to ensure safety.
This approach is useful when not all failures are of
equal consequence and there is a relatively small number of
failures that can lead to catastrophic results. Under these
circumstances, it is possible to augment traditional
reliability techniques that attempt to eliminate all failures
with techniques that concentrate on the high-cost failures.
These new techniques often involve a "backward" approach that
starts with determining what are unacceptable or high-cost
failures and then ensures that these particular failures do
not occur or at least minimizes the probability of their
occurrences. [Leveson 1986]
In system engineering, reliability and safety are
usually distinguished. After some significant mishaps, system
safety has begun to receive more attention with stricter
standards being issued and enforced. When software
constitutes an important part of a safety-critical system
software safety needs to be given the same attention.
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2. Safety versus Security
Safety and security are closely related. Both deal
with threats or risks, one with threats to life or property
and the other with threats to privacy or national security.
Both often involve negative requirements that may conflict
with some important functional or mission requirements. Both
involve requirements that are considered of supreme importance
in deciding whether the system can and should be used.
[Leveson 1986]
Security focuses on unauthorized actions, whereas
safety is more concerned with inadvertent actions. The
primary emphasis in security research has been on preventing
unauthorized access to classified information.
3. A Systems Approach
It has been argued that there is no such thing as
software safety since software cannot, by itself, be unsafe.
A broader system view is that software can have various
unexpected and undesired effects when used in a complex system
[Dean 1981] . Software is correct or incorrect only with
respect to some larger system in which it is functioning.
Safety must be defined in terms of hazards or states
of the system that when combined with certain environmental
conditions could lead to a mishap. Risk is a function of the
probability of the hazardous state occurring, the probability
of the hazard leading to a mishap, and the perceived severity
of the worst potential mishap that could result from the
12
hazard. Thus there are two aspects of risk: 1) the
probability of the system getting into a hazardous state and
2) the probability of the hazard leading to a mishap combined
with the severity of the resulting mishap. System hazards may
be caused by hardware component failure, design faults in the
hardware or software, interfacing problems between components
of the system, human error in operation or maintenance, or
environmental problems. [Leveson 1986]
An accident is traditionally defined by safety
engineers as an unwanted and unexpected release of energy
[Johnson 1973] . Mishap is an unplanned event or series of
events that result in death, injury, occupational illness,
damage to or loss of equipment or property. [Leveson 198 6]
Mishaps are almost always caused by multiple factors,
and the relative contribution of each factor is usually not
clear. A mishap can be thought of as a set of events
combining in a random fashion [Petersen 1971], or
alternatively, as a dynamic mechanism that begins with the
activation of a hazard and flows through the system as a
series of events in a logical sequence until the system is out
of control and a loss is produced [Malaslcy 1982] .
The state of the system is made up of the states of
the components of the system, one of which is the computer.
Often the computer acts as the controller of the system and
thus has a direct effect on the current state. Therefore it
ma]ces sense to tal]c about "software safety" since the software
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usually has at least partial control over whether the system
is in a hazardous state or not. [Leveson 198 6]
Software safety then involves ensuring the software
will execute within a system context without resulting in
unacceptable risk. What risk is acceptable or unacceptable
must be defined for each system. As with "hardware safety",
software safety is achieved by identifying potential hazards
early in the development process and then establishing
requirements and design features to eliminate or control these
hazards [Ericson 1981] . Safety-critical software functions
are those that can directly or indirectly cause or allow a
hazardous system state to exist. [Leveson 1986]
4 . Why Does a Problem Exist ?
"Many of the system safety techniques that have been
developed to aid in building electromechanical systems with
minimal risk do not seem to apply when computers are
introduced. The major differences appear to stem from the
differences between hardware and software and from the lack of
system-level approaches to building software controlled
systems." [Leveson 1986]
System safety techniques are designed to cope
primarily with random failures in these systems. Human design
errors are not considered since it is assumed that all faults
caused by human errors can be avoided completely or located
and removed prior to delivery and operation [Lauber 1980].
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The advent of microprocessors and powerful automation
procedures have dramatically increased the complexity of
software and hardware, causing a nonlinear increase in
h\aman-error-induced design faults. Because of this
complexity, it appears to be impossible to demonstrate that
the design of the computer hardware or software of a realistic
control system is correct and that failure mechanisms are
completely eliminated [Lauber 1980] . By using computers to
control processes, we are increasing both of these factors
and, therefore increasing the potential for problems.
An important difference between conventional hardware
control systems and computer-based control systems is that
hardware has historical usage information, whereas control
software usually does not [Gloe 1979] . Hardware is usually
produced in greater quantities than software, and standard
components are reused frequently. Therefore reliability can
be measured and improved through experience in other
applications. Software, on the other hand, is almost always
specifically constructed for each application.
Not only are exhaustive testing and analysis
impossible for most nontrivial software, but it is difficult
to provide realistic test conditions. Most testing must be
done in a simulation mode, and there is no way to guarantee
that the simulation is accurate. Assumptions must always be
made about the controlled process and its environment [Leveson
1986] . For example, the limits on the range of control
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imposed by the software for the F/A-18 aircraft are based on
assumptions about the ability of the aircraft to achieve
certain attitudes, but unfortunately, a mishap occurred
because an intentionally excluded attitude was actually
attainable [Neumann 1981] . A wing-mounted missile on the
F/A-18 failed to separate from the launcher after ignition
because a computer program signaled the missile-retaining
mechanism to close before the rocket had built up sufficient
thrust to clear the missile from the wing [Frola and Miller
1984] . An incorrect assumption had been made about the amount
of time that this would take. The aircraft went out of
control. [Leveson 1986]
"These types of problems are not caught by the usual
simulation process since they either have been considered and
discarded as unreasonable or involve a misunderstanding about
the actual operation of the process being controlled by the
computer." [Leveson 1986] After studying serious mishaps
related to computers, system safety engineers have concluded
that inadequate design foresight and specification errors are
the greatest cause of software safety problems [Ericson 1981;
Griggs 1981] . Testing can show the consistency only with the
requirements as specified; it cannot identify
misunderstandings about the requirements. These can be
identified only by use of the software in the actual system,
which can, of course, lead to mishaps. Also, accurate live
16
testing of computer responses to catastrophic situations is of
course, difficult in the absence of accidents [Leveson 1986]
.
"The point in time or environmental conditions under
which the computer fault occurs may determine the seriousness
of the result. Software faults may not be detectable except
under just the right combination of circumstances, and it is
difficult, if not impossible, to consider and account for all
environmental factors and all conditions under which the
software may be operating." [Leveson 1986]
To complicate things even further, most verification
and validation techniques for software assume "perfect"
execution environments. "However software failures may be
caused by such undetected hardware errors as transient faults
causing mutilation of data, security violations, human
mistakes during operation and maintenance, errors in
underlying or supporting software, or interface problems with
other parts of the system such as timing errors. It is
difficult, if not impossible, to test the software under all
failure modes of the system. Trying to include all of these
factors in the analysis or testing procedures makes the
problem truly impossible to solve, given today's technology."
[Leveson 1986]
For hardware, redundancy can be used to provide fault
tolerance, since either the individual components can be shown
to fail independently, or common-mode analysis techniques can
detail dependent failure modes and minimize them. A similar
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application of redundancy has been proposed for software
[Anderson and Lee 1981; Avizienis 1985] . There is no evidence
that the high reliability required in safety-critical software
can be achieved using these techniques. Perhaps the most
important consideration is that most fault-tolerance methods
do not solve the problem of erroneous requirements [Leveson
1986]
.
The greatest cause of the problems experienced when
computers are used to control complex processes may be a laclc
of system-level methods and viewpoints. Many
hardware-oriented system engineers do not understand software
because of the youth of software engineering and the
significant differences between software and hardware [Ericson
1981]. The same is true, in reverse, for software engineers.
This has led system engineers to consider the computer as a
black box [Griggs 1981; Kletz 1983; Software Safety Handboo]c]
,
whereas the software engineer has treated the computer as
merely a stimulus-response system [Alford 1985 and Davis
1982] . This lack of communication has been blamed for several
mishaps. [Leveson 1986]
An obvious conclusion is that system-level approaches
are necessary [Boebert 1980; Lauber 1980; Leveson and Stolzy
1987] . In fact, it is difficult to define a software "fault"
without considering the system. If the problem stems from an
error in the requirements, then the software may be "correct"
with respect to the stated software requirements, but wrong
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from a system standpoint. A particular software fault may
cause a mishap only if there is a simultaneous human and/or
hardware failure. "Software engineering techniques that do
not consider the system as a whole, including the interactions
between the hardware, software, and human operators, will have
limited usefulness for real-time control software." [Leveson
1986]
Traditional software engineering techniques tend to
consider the software in a vacuum. But examining the software
separately does not provide information about interfacing
problems between the software and other components of the
system. By looking at the software alone, it is impossible to
examine problems which occur only as a result of an
interaction between software and a failure of another system
component. [Leveson and Stolzy 1983]
The software must be analyzed within the context of
the entire system, including the computer hardware, the other
components of the system, and the environment. Software as a
black box in a system is no longer a valid approach. A total
system concept must be considered within the analysis so the
effects of the software on the whole system can be taken into
account. [Leveson 1986]
B. TECHNIQUES FOR SOFTWARE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS ANALYSIS
Determining the requirements for software has proven to be
very difficult. Besides timed Petri nets [Leveson and Stolzy
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1987], several techniques have been proposed and used in
limited contexts, including fault tree analysis and real-time
logic. This is a major source of software problems and may be
the most important with respect to safety
=
While functional requirements often focus on what the
system shall do, safety requirements must also include what
the system shall not do - including means of eliminating and
controlling system hazards and of limiting damage in case of a
mishap. An important part of the safety requirements is the
specification of the ways in which the software and the system
can fail safely and to what extent failure is tolerable.
[Leveson 1986]
1 . Fault Tree Analysis
Fault Tree Analysis [Vesely et al. 1981] is an
analytical technique used in the safety analysis of
electromechanical systems. An undesired system state is
specified and the system is then analyzed in the context of
its environment and operation to find believable sequences of
events that can lead to the undesired state. The fault tree
is a graphic model of various parallel and sequential
combinations of faults that will result in the occurrence of
the unwanted event. A fault tree depicts the logical
interrelationships of basic events that can lead to the
hazardous event. [Leveson 1986]
"The success of the technique is highly dependent on
the ability of the analyst, who must thoroughly understand the
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system being analyzed and its underlying scientific
principles. However, it has the advantage that all of the
system components can be considered. This is extremely
important because a particular software fault may cause a
mishap only if there is a simultaneous human and/or hardware
failure. Alternatively, the environmental failure may cause
the software fault to manifest itself." [Leveson 1986]
The analysis starts with a list of system hazards that
have been identified by a preliminary hazard analysis (PHA) .
A separate fault tree must be constructed for each hazardous
event. The basic procedure is to assume that the hazard has
occurred and then to work backward to determine the set of
possible causes.
Software control faults may include: 1) failure to
perform a required function, 2) performing a function not
required, 3) timing or sequencing problems, 4) failure to
recognize a hazardous condition requiring corrective action,
and 5) producing the wrong response to a hazardous condition.
As the development of the software proceeds, fault
tree analysis can be performed on the design and finally the
actual code. Software fault tree analysis can be used to
determine software safety requirements, detect software logic
errors, identify multiple failure sequences involving
different parts of the system (hardware, human, and software)
that can lead to hazards, and guide in the selection of
critical run-time checks. It can also be used as a guide for
21
testing. The interfaces of the software parts of the fault
tree can be examined to determine appropriate test input data
and appropriate simulation states and events. [Leveson 1986]
For further information on this technique the reader is
referred to [Leveson and Stolzy 1983] and [Mclntee 1983]
.
2 o Real-Time Logic
Jahanian and Mok [1986] have shown how to formalize
the safety analysis of timing properties in real-time systems
using a formal real-time logic (RTL) . The system designer
first specifies a model of the system in terms of events and
actions
.
To analyze the system design, the RTL formulas are
translated into predicates of Presburger arithmetic with
uninterpreted integer functions. Decision procedures are then
used to determine whether a given safety assertion is a
theorem derivable from the system specification. If so, the
system is safe with respect to the timing behavior denoted by
that assertion as long as the implementation satisfies the
requirements specification. If the safety assertion is
unsatisfiable with respect to the specification, then the
system is inherently unsafe because successful implementation
of the requirements will cause the safety assertion to be
violated. A restricted set of Presburger formulas are used
that allow for a more efficient decision procedure. [Leveson
1986]
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III. A SAMPLE REAL-TIME SOFTWARE SYSTEM
A. CHOICE OF A SYSTEM
In choosing a system to evaluate Petri net modeling for
software safety analysis it was necessary to find a system
that would be small and at the same time representative of a
number of systems. The system needed to be small enough to
build the model, perform the analysis and write about it in a
limited period of time. For a system to be representative it
needed to be a real-time system with interacting components
and be a subsystem of a total system with software and
hardware concerns as well as environmental concerns. If a
real life system could not be found, for research purposes a
sample system would have to be created.
Fortunately, there was a need for a software safety
analysis on a real life problem at The Naval Weapons Center in
China Lake, California. After a meeting to discuss the system
and a preliminary analysis, the system was determined to be
small enough in size to be tackled in a short period of time
and to be able to make an accurate assessment of the
technique.
The system that was chosen was an interrupted-explosive
train safety-arming (SA) device for a guided-missile. This
project was a new concept being investigated by the Navy to
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use software and a microcomputer to replace a mechanical
device to perform the safe separation distance calculation for
a safety arming device. This project could potentially have a
tremendous cost saving to the Navy and would provide a
state-of-the-art way of doing business.
A software prototype of the system was written and tested^
but without safety considerations. For a complete listing of
the software see Appendix A. Since the safety considerations
had not been fully considered this system should be ideal for
evaluating the effectiveness of the Petri net technique.
B. SYSTEM BACKGROUND
A safety arming device is a precision safety item
incorporating mechanical, electronic, and explosive
components. The function of the safety arming device is to
prevent inadvertent high-explosive warhead initiations
throughout the logistic cycle of a weapon, with a high degree
of confidence, and to arm at the correct point in tactical use
for desired warhead initiation. [McVay 1987]
The safety features for the design of a safety arming
device are contained in [MIL-STD-1316C] . There must be two
independent safety features: 1) to prevent unintentional
arming and 2) to provide forces to remove safety features
derived from different environments. Operation of at least
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one of these safety features shall depend on sensing a
post-launch environment.
Safety features shall also provide an arming delay. The
arming delay shall provide safe separation distance for all
defined operational conditions. Also, an assembled fuze shall
not be capable of being armed manually.
In the strictly mechanical systems, the SA device contains
a mechanism that is mechanically locked in the "safe" position
until it is unlocked by application of an electrical current
to a solenoid. When the rocket motor in the guided missile is
fired, missile acceleration drives a setback weight that is
connected to a rotor containing the interrupted element
through the gears of an escapement mechanism. The escapement
acts as a pseudo-integrator which facilitates moving the rotor
from the "interrupted" or "safe" position to the "armed"
position when the missile has traveled a preset safe distance
from the launcher. [McVay 1987]
A block diagram of a generic non-interrupted explosive
train SA device for a boosted guided missile is shown in
Figure 2-1. The block diagram was specifically formulated for
a guided missile SA device and therefore contains two
interrupters. One interrupter is in the low voltage section
and one is in the high voltage section. The interrupters are
directly and mechanically locked as required by MIL-STD-1316C
25
and the interrupters are removed by energy from a unique























Figure 2-1. Boosted Guided Missile Noninterrupted Explosive
Train SA Device
In the prototype system with a microcomputer and software,
the scenario starts with the missile on the aircraft rack. The
aircraft sends an intent to launch, which sends power to the
computer and software. This also begins to charge the firing
capacitor. The intent to launch unlocks the safety arming
device and fires the thermal battery. The rocket motor fires
and the missile launches. A 4+ G boost occurs and the safety
arming device begins to compute safe separation distance. The
software goes through three iterations where it reaches a
specific distance and toggles a solenoid at each preset
26
distance. Each solenoid toggle activates a ball locking
mechanism and once three toggles have occurred the mechanical
detonator interrupter is removed. Now the safety arming
device arms and when target detection occurs a signal is sent
to detonate the warhead.
The software for this system resides on a Intel 8048
silicon chip microcomputer and is written in 8048 assembly
language. The 8048 is a 40 pin package containing:
1) an 8-bit CPU, 2) IK x 8 ROM program memory, 3) 64 x 8 RAM
data memory, 4) 2 7 I/O lines, and 5) 8-bit timer/event
counter. It also has a 2.5 or 5.0 microsecond cycle time and
90 instruction instruction-set [Intel 1978] .
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IV, PETRI NET THEORY AND MODELING METHODOLOGY
A. WHY PETRI NETS?
Petri nets have been developed from the early work of Carl
Adam Petri, "Kommunikation mit Automaten" [Petri 1962] . Petri
formulated the basis for a theory of communication between
asynchronous components of a computer system. A.W. Holt and
others studied the work of Petri and much of the early theory,
notation, and the representation of Petri nets developed from
their work. This work showed how Petri nets could be applied
to the modeling and analysis of systems of concurrent
components
.
Petri nets were designed for and are used mainly for
modeling. Many systems, especially those with independent
components can be modeled by a Petri net.
Petri nets have been used to model and analyze systems for
such properties as deadlock and reachability. In this thesis
the goal is to show whether or not Petri nets can be used to
adequately model a system for software safety analysis. A
systems approach is valid since hardware, software, and human
behavior can be modeled all in one net.
Before providing a formal definition for using Petri nets
to model real time systems, the motivation for using this
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method is discussed. A detailed description of the elements
in a Petri net model will be discussed in an upcoming section.
1. Parallelism
Petri nets are able to model parallelism and
concurrency. Consider the case of two processes. Each
process can be represented by a Petri net. Thus the composite
Petri net, which is the union of the Petri nets for each of
the two processes can represent the concurrent execution of
the two processes.
An example, shown in Figure 4-1, is the FORK and JOIN
operations originally proposed by Dennis and Van Horn [1966]
.
A FORK j operation executed at location i results in the
current process continuing at location i + 1 and a new process
being created with execution started at location j. A JOIN
operation will recombine two processes into one (or
equivalently will destroy one of the two and let the other




The sharing of resources and information between
processes must be controlled to ensure correct operation of
the overall system. Petri nets can also model
synchronization. A synchronization problem which illustrates
the types of problems which can arise between cooperating
processes is the mutual exclusion problem [Dijlcstra 1965],
presented in Figure 4-2.
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FORK JOIN
Figure 4-1. Modeling FORK and JOIN with Petri nets
In mutual exclusion, access to the critical sections
of the two processes is controlled so that both processes
cannot simultaneously execute their critical sections.
In this Petri net, place m represents the permission
to enter the critical section. For a process to enter the
critical section, it must have a token in pi or p2, as
appropriate, signalling that it wishes to enter the critical
section, and there must be a token in place m signalling
permission to enter. If both processes wish to enter
simultaneously, then transitions tl and t2 are in conflict,
and only one of them can fire. Firing tl will disable
transition t2, requiring process 2 to wait until the first
process exits its critical section and puts a token back in
place m. [Peterson 1981]
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Process 1 Process 2
Figure 4-2. Mutual exclusion modeled with Petri nets
3 . Software Hazard Analysis
Petri net models have been proposed for software
hazard analysis. Petri nets allow mathematical modeling of
discrete-event systems in terms of conditions and events and
the relationship between them. Analysis and simulation
procedures have been developed to determine desirable and
undesirable properties of the design, especially with respect
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to concurrent or parallel events. Leveson and Stolzy [1987]
have developed analysis procedures to determine software
safety requirements (including timing requirements) directly
from the system design, to analyze a design for safety,
recoverability, and fault tolerance, and to guide in the use
of failure detection and recovery procedures.
Faults and failures can be incorporated into the Petri
net model to determine their effects on the system [Leveson
and Stolzy 1987] . Baclcward analysis procedures can be used to
determine which failures and faults are potentially the most
hazardous and therefore which parts of the system need to be
augmented with fault-tolerance and fail-safe mechanisms.
Early in the design of the system it is possible to treat the
software parts of the design at a very high level of
abstraction and consider only failures at the interfaces of
the software and nonsoftware components. By worlcing bacJcward
to the software interfaces, it is possible to determine the
software safety requirements and identify the most critical
functions. [Leveson 1986]
Now that part of the motivation for use of Petri nets
has been provided, a formal definition of Petri nets is
provided using the notation of Peterson [Peterson 1981]
.
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B. PETRI NET THEORY
1. Petri Net Structure
dg^finition : Petri net structure, O, is a 5-tuple,
C=(P,T, 1,0,^1).
P = {pi,P2f • • • f Pn^ ^2 ^ finite set of places, n > 0.
T = {ti,t2r • • ' ftj^} is a finite set of transitions, m > .
The set of places and the set of transitions are
disjoint, P n T = <|).
I:T —> P**® is the input function, a mapping from transitions
to bags of places
.
O: T —> P** is the output function, a mapping from
transitions to bags of places.
|Iq:P—»N is the initial marking for the net where N is the
set of nonnegative integers.
A bag is a generalization of a set that allows
multiple occurrences of an element. The operations on bags
are union, intersection, sum, and difference.







The use of bags for the inputs and outputs of a
transition allows a place to be a multiple input or a multiple
output of a transition.
definition : The multiplicity of an input place pi for a
transition tj is the number of occurrences of the place in the
input bag of the transition, # (Pi^ I(tj)).
I and can be extended to map places into bags of
transitions in addition to mapping transitions into bags of
places.
2. Petri Net Graphs
A Petri net graph is a representation of a Petri net
structure as a bipartite directed multigraph.
A Petri net has two types of nodes:
• a circle \J represents a place
• a bar | represents a transition
Directed arcs connect the places and the transitions.
Multiple inputs to a transition are indicated by multiple arcs
from the input places to a transition.
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definition : a transition tj is an input of place p^ if pj_ is
an output of t j
.
# (tj.Kpi)) = # (Pi,0(tj))
I: P -> T*^^ 0: P -^ T**
In Figure 4-3, tl represents a transition that is an
input of place PI and place PI is an output of transition tl.
"kH)
Figure 4-3. Transition tl is an input to place PI
definition : a transition tj is an output of place pj_ if p-i_ is
an input of t j
.
#(tj,0(pi)) = # (pi,I(tj))
In Figure 4-4, tl represents an output of place PI and
place PI is an input of transition tl.
tl
&-^
Figure 4-4. Transition tl is an output of place PI
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3. Execution Rules for Petri Nets
The execution of a Petri net is controlled by the
number and distribution of tokens in the net. Tokens reside
in the places and control the execution of the transitions of
the net.
A Petri net executes by firing transitions. A
transition fires by removing tokens from its input places and
then depositing into each of its output places one token from
each arc from the transition to the place. A transition may
fire only if it is enabled.
definition : a transition is enabled ^ as in Figures 4-5, 4-6,
and 4-7, if each of its input places has at least as many
tokens in it as arcs from the place to the transition.
Multiple tokens are needed for multiple input arcs. The
tokens in the input places which enable a transition are its
enabling tokens.
C^h"




Figure 4-6. Transition t2 is enabled
Figure 4-7. Transition t3 is enabled
In Figure 4-8, transition t4 is not enabled, since




Figure 4-8. Transition t4 is not enabled
Figures 4-9 and 4-10 show how multiple tokens are





Figure 4-9. Tl is enabled
t1OW9
Figure 4-10. After tl fires
In the following example, shown in Figures 4-11 and
4-12, the transition has multiple input arcs, with only a




Figure 4-11. Transition tl is enabled
tl
0:^-0
Figure 4-12 . After tl fires
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Transition firings can continue as long as there
exists at least one enabled transition. When there are no
enabled transitions, the execution halts.
4. Petri Net State Spaces
The state of a Petri net is defined by its markings.
For example, if a token is present in each one of these
places: P1,P3,P5, then (P1P3P5) represents the state of the
net. The change in state caused by firing a transition is
defined by the next-state function 5.
\ definition
:
The next state function 5: N^ X T —> N^ for a
Petri net 0= {F ,1,1,0, [Iq) with marking )i and transition tj g T
is defined if and only if tj is enabled.
If 5(|l, tj) is defined, then 5(ll, tj) = |J.' where
^i' (Pi) =^i(Pi) - #(Pi,I(tj)) + #(Pi,0(tj)) for all Pi e P.
5. Time Petri Nets
In this research, the Time Petri nets are not used,
but the approach used is the traditional concept of Petri
nets. There are some notations made concerning the timing
constraints of the system and the timing constraints are
considered. Safety concepts not concerning timing constraints
can be considered with the use of traditional nets.
The information concerning Time Petri nets is included
as an assistance to the reader, since an application might be
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concerned with critical timing constraints. In either
approach, it is important first to build the untimed Petri net
model and then to add the timing constraints.
To model real time requires enhancements to the
traditional Petri net model. There have been several
proposals for extending standard Petri nets to include time,
Leveson and Stolzy [1987] chose the Merlin and Farber [197 6]
approach where min and max times define a range of delays for
each transition. Tolcens are allowed to remain on the input
places during the transition delay so the model retains the
instantaneous firing features of untimed Petri nets while also
providing a very flexible modeling tool.
A Time Petri net is a Petri net plus the added firing
time functions min and max. The firing time functions specify
the conditions under which a transition may fire.
A formal definition of a Time Petri Net structure is:
<I> = (P,T, I,0,Min,Max,|lQ ).
P={Pl/P2' • • • 'Pn^ ^s a finite set of places, n>0
.
T={tl, t2, . .
.
, tm} is a finite set of transitions, m>0
.
The set of places and the set of transitions are disjoint,
P nT = (>.
I: T —> P** is the input function, a mapping from transitions
to bags of places
.
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0: T —> P** is the output function, a mapping from
transitions to bags of places.
Min and Max are the min time function and max time function,
respect ive 1y , where
:
Min: T —> R and Max: T -> R, R is the set of nonnegative real
numbers and Min^ < Max^ for all i such that t-^ e T.
|i,Q : P —> N is the initial marking for the net where N is the
set of nonnegative integers.
definition
;
A transition tj is firable at time T if and only
if it has been continuously enabled during the interval X-
Min(tj) to X. The firable transition may fire at any time X
for Min (tj) < X < Max (tj) . A transition must fire at time X
if it has been continuously enabled during the interval X -
Max (tj) to X.
definition The state of the net a consists of the tuple
(|I,E) where \i is the marking and E is the remaining enabling
time vector.
E is a function of a set of tuples of real numbers R, E:
(R X R) -^ (R X R) .
The timed Petri nets are more complex because of the
continuous nature of time. Since transitions may fire at any
time in their allowed interval, the states have in general an
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unbounded number of successors [Leveson and Stolzy 1987]
.
Berthomieu and Menasche [1983] solve this problem by defining
state classes that consider the set of all states reachable
from the initial state by a given sequences of transitions.
The Time Petri net is equivalent to a standard Petri
net if all Min times are and all Max times are set to <».
Also note that the markings of the Time Petri net reachability
graph, discussed in the next chapter, will be equal to or a
subset of the marlcings of the equivalent untimed Petri net.
This is true since the enabling rules for the Time Petri net
are the same as for the untimed Petri net. [Leveson and Stolzy
1987]
C. BUILDING THE PETRI NET MODEL
In Petri net modeling, conditions are modeled by places
and events are modeled by transitions. The inputs of a
transition are the preconditions and the outputs of a
transition are the postconditions.
The holding of a condition is represented by a tolcen in
the place corresponding to the condition. The occurrence of
an event corresponds to a firing.
The modeling and analysis presented in this thesis is
concerned with the system and software at the design level and
not at the implementation and software code level. Another
approach or technique should be used to determine software
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safety at the code level. The analysis performed in the next
chapter is concerned mainly with whether the safety
requirements for the design of the system are met.
1. Starting the Process
The method used to arrive at the model for the
real-time system was not exactly done as proposed in this
thesis. The process was started from prototype software code
[Appendix A] and worked backward to create the necessary
diagrams and charts. It was necessary to work backwards to a
software flowchart and to piece together a few system designs
to arrive at an overall system design. The situation that is
recommended for the software safety analyst should be that he
is presented with the flowchart and the design of the system
and is then asked to perform the analysis. It is possible
however to be given software and work backwards to a safety
analysis of the design, using this method. If the necessary
items listed below are not available, the analyst will have to
create these documents to aid in building the model used for
the analysis.
The main question to be answered is: after the Petri
net model has been built, does the model provide sufficient
information to enable software safety analysis? Then, if this
model is sufficient, is there a methodology that can be used
that can help to create this model. One of the crucial
advantages of a methodolgy is that it is repeatable.
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The difficult part of building the model is not to
include anything in the model that was not actually specified
in the design. Otherwise, this may cause the model to include
a design feature that does not actually exist. This can lead
to either the analysis missing a safety design problem or a
design problem being added unnecessarily to the model.
The advantage of any structured methodology is that it
forces the analyst to ask questions and it forces a clearer
analysis at an earlier stage, where it is important to
discover errors. The methodolgy that is proposed is
presented in a step-by-step fashion, but the first model
created should be the base on which other models are built.
The model should be presented and discussed with the
designer (s) of the system and it should be updated until all
involved are in agreement that the model truly represents the
design. Between the safety analyst and the designer all of
these questions should be cleared up before the actual
production of the system. If the analyst is unsure of a
sequence of events or anything is unclear it should be cleared
up while the model is being built. It is possible that
during this phase some safety design problems may appear and
this is beneficial because the goal of this process is for the
end result to be a safer product, no matter how it is arrived
at. The purpose of the model is to expose areas that need
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safety design help. The benefit of any design/analysis tool
is that it can help produce a safer product.
The Petri net model is created as an analysis tool,
but according to Leveson [1986], since the time spent building
the model is nontrivial, some of the effort may be justified
by using the model for other objectives, for example,
performance analysis.
In the search for a methodology, what information is
needed to build the model? What types of diagrams and charts
do we need to model a real-time system? To build the model it
is useful to break the system into more comprehensible parts
and then combine them later.
The analyst should begin by defining the system and
the environment surrounding the software, then concentrate on
the software. Within the system, the system elements should
be defined, followed by the system flowchart being translated
into Petri nets. The analyst should then concentrate on the
software by translating the software flowchart into Petri
nets. The last step is the combination of the system and the
software by connecting all of the software/system interfaces.
As a minimum, the available information should
include
:
• Flowchart of software
• Flowchart of system environment
• System Elements Chart, including states of elements
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• Software Elements, driven by Flowchart
• Initial Conditions (State) of the system and software
• Verbal description of each module of system
• Overall description of entire system
In order to adequately model a system all significant
states of the system must be considered and explicitly
presented in the model. In the translation from the design
charts to the model, all significant states of the system
elements must be included.
In general, if in building the model some extra
information about states of the system were included in the
model, it would not affect the model, but might add to the
clarity, while adding some complexity. Adding unnecessary
items to the model is not optimal, but if during construction
of the model the analyst is unsure, he should include the
information and not throw it away; it might be needed later.
The experience of the analyst would help to decide which
states would be important in terms of overall system safety.
The key is to remember that the Petri net model tries
to include all possible states that the system can reach. The
analysis of the model concentrates on whether the system
either cannot reach hazardous states or that if it does, the
system can control the result.
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2. Defining and Modeling the Systg^m Elements
The best place to start the modeling is with the
system surrounding the software. Before looking at the
overall system flowchart it is necessary to first define the
elements of the system. To make a list of these, the analyst
needs to review the system flowchart and the system
descriptions. A complete listing of all the system elements
is included in Appendix D and the corresponding Petri net
model in Appendix E.
To give some examples of the system elements and how
they are modeled, a few are examined below. The following is a
detonation interruptor element, which moves a third of the way
towards removal each time the solenoid toggles. Thus, after
three toggles of the solenoid and the unlocking of the safety
arming device, the detonation interruptor is removed. Figures




Figure 4-13. Detonation Interruptor
Figure 4-15 below shows a direct translation from the
system elements to the actual Petri net model. The model








Figure 4-14 . Detonation Interruptor Removal











Figure 4-15 . Petri net model of detonation interruptor
removal
In Petri net modeling there are many instances of
binary or two-state occurrences, i.e. on/off, left/right, or
enable/disable. In Petri net modeling there are two ways to
describe these. The differences depend on whether the
interface with the two-state elements requires continuation
feedback or whether the state is changed and the system moves
on. For example in Figure 4-16, another system element, the






Figure 4-16. Analog/Digital Converter
Figure 4-17 shows the translation of the
Analog/Digital Converter into a Petri net model. In the
system model this element requires continuation feedback to
the next step of the model. After the enable transition, the
next transition in the system to input data from the
analog/digital converter. Thus, the first transition is
necessary to allow the next transition.
Figure 4-17 . Analog/Digital Converter Petri net model
The Intent to Launch (ITL) Sensor, shown in Figure
4-18, is an example of the other type of two-state element
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with no feedback. Initially, the ITL Sensor is off meaning
that the ITL signal has not yet occurred. When the ITL
signal is received the transition causes the two-state element










Figure 4-18. ITL Sensor Petri net model
To provide a methodolgy for building a Petri net model
it is useful to provide common abstractions that can always be
modeled the same way. Such abstractions are the two types of
binary state system elements. Figure 4-19 shows the generic
model for a two-state element with feedback and Figure 4-20
shows a two-state element without feedback. These are
exact duplicates of Figures 4-17 and 4-18 (from the real
system) , where the common abstraction allows two transitions,
i.e. turn on and turn off.
One typical difficulty with creating this type of
diagram (model) is that once the model is built and put on
paper no one besides the builder can understand or read it.
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Figure 4-19. Two-state element with feedback
Figure 4-20. Two-state element without feedback
because it is far too complex, with lines going all over the
place. In order to simplify the model, the system elements
can be represented as black boxes in the model and the inside
states can be represented on a separate chart . Also to
simplify the model if a system element is accessed more than
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once in different areas of the model, for readibility it is
useful to repeat the element and signify that it is the same
element with a certain marking. In this model repeated
elements have the same border markings.
The few items that have just been mentioned are an
attempt to manage complexity problems. If the design is to
be changed or updated and then the model, there must be a
systematic discipline to manage the updating.
Once all of the system elements have been defined and
their corresponding model has been built, the focus of
attention can move to the actual translation of the system
flowchart, including, as the work progresses, the system
elements as they fit into the model.
3. System Flowchart
A system flowchart of the events occurring in the
system should have been prepared by the designer of the
system. A complete system flowchart for the guided missile
system is included in Appendix C.
There is a direct translation from the system
flowchart to the Petri net model. Figure 4-21 illustrates the
translation from the system flowchart to the Petri net model,
which will make this statement more apparent.
During this translation, the system elements, in this
example the state of the computer, which interface with the












Figure 4-21. System Flowchart translation to Petri net
whether all binary states (on/off) of the system elements need
to be explicitly mentioned to determine software safety, but
it is better to include them in the model for a more complete
representation of the state of the system. The additional
states will not affect the model and might actually add more
clarity. Unfortunately, it also adds more complexity to the
model, but do not worry about that at this point.
At this point, the reader has probably realized that
it is difficult to separate the various parts of this process
and there is definite overlap between parts of the processes.
If the proposed methodology is followed all of the components
of the system should be included. The main concern is to
model all states of the system.
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4o Modeling the Software
With the system level now modeled the analyst can move
into the software modeling. The first step is to translate
the flowchart directly into a Petri net and then add the
software elements which interface with the software. Then the
system level should be interfaced with the software, making
sure to connect the system components. This should actually
be done simultaneously with the software flowchart
translation.
Petri nets represent the control structure of programs
well. Since a flowchart represents the flow of control in a
program, it is very similar in nature to a Petri net.
[Peterson 1981]
A flowchart is composed of nodes of two types:
decisions represented by diamond shapes and computations
represented by rectangles, and arcs between them. Petri nets
model the sequencing of instructions and the flow of
information and computation but not the actual computation
values themselves. The Petri net of the software is an
abstraction of the modeled system. The appropriate translation
from a flowchart to a Petri net replaces the nodes of the
flowchart with transitions in the Petri net and the arcs of
the flowchart with places in the Petri net [Peterson 1981]
.
Each arc of the flowchart is represented by exactly one place
in the corresponding net. A convenient way to execute a
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flowchart is to introduce a token which represents the current
instruction. The flowchart, in this sense is actually
representing the state of the software in the form of a
state-transition diagram.
Figures 4-22,4-24, and 4-26 show some generic examples
of how flowchart symbols can be translated into Petri
net modeling symbols. In a software flowchart the main two








Figure 4-22. Petri net model of a flowchart computation
For the complete software flowchart, the reader is
referred to Appendix B. Figure 4-23 is an example from the





















Figure 4-23. Flowchart translation to Petri net model
In order to model a decision there are two possible
interpretations. The first interpretation assumes that an
external agent just resolves the decision and goes directly to





Figure 4-24. Modeling a software decision
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Figure 4-25 displays the interpretation used for this
thesis. This interpretation takes into account that there is
an additional event, which is an actual check or comparison in
order to make the decision, but that the decision is made by
an external agent. Figure 4-26 is a real-time system example













Figure 4-26. System Example of Flowchart to Petri net model
57
An OR condition is equivalent to a decision and should
be modeled the same way. The model consists of one place with
two output arcs from it, leading to the two transition
choices, allowing an external agent to choose one path or the
other.
While reviewing the software flowchart all software
elements such as counters or any binary variables, that affect
a state should be included. Counters can be modeled as a
single state and the number of tokens present in the state can
model the count. The counter of the state of the pointer is a
software element in this system. This pointer variable
counter can be in one of three states . As the pointer value
is increased the state is represented by the number of tokens
present in the place.
Figure 4-27 is a larger example of a translation from
the flowchart to the Petri net model. The similarities
between the two are readily visible when they are presented
side by side.
The system elements included in this section of the
flowchart and model are the A/D Converter, Figure 4-17 and the
ITL Sensor, Figure 4-18. In this excerpt, the A/D Converter
is repeated in four different places. This is the same system
element and this is represented by the identical border around
the element name. Inside this element are the same three

















































Figure 4-27. Translation from Flowchart to Petri net model
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leading to the transitions t26, and t27 respectively (denoted
by the number in brackets) , describe where the input line is
leading. The feedback line coming out of the element is from
the feedback place in the system element. The reader is
referred back to the appropriate figures to make this point
clearer.
In software modeling, as in system modeling, there is
the need to abstract common elements that can always be
modeled the same way. The software elements that lead to this
modeling are shown in Figures 4-28 and 4-29 and are followed
by Figure 4-30 which shows an example of the real-time system




Figure 4-28. Software Element for Toggling Mechanism
Solenoid Status Variable
toggle
Figure 4-29. Description of two-state Variable
When the two system elements are put together, the end
result is the toggling mechanism for the solenoid status.
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without the specific place numbers and transition numbers,
this can represent a generic abstraction for any toggling
mechanism including a binary state variable.
Figure 4-30. Toggling the Solenoid Status
5 . Completing the Model
Now that the analyst has put all of the parts of the
model together, it is time to review the model for
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completeness and to present the model to the designer (s) of
the system. To construct a final model of this system it took
three different versions and two reviews of the model.
D. DIFFICULTIES WITH MODELING
The major difficulty with modeling in general, not just
with Petri nets is, what level of detail does the analyst
model in the system? As the analyst goes through the building
process what are the subjective judgements that are made about
the system? A methodology has been proposed that constructs a
model, but it is difficult to say that this is the optimum
model available given the system. The model represents an
cibstraction and when the analyst is dealing with system
elements should the model represent an abstraction of the
element or model the exact function of the element. The
analyst needs to pick a happy median and hopefully this thesis
provides the steps necessary to arrive at that median.
When modeling system elements and decisions on these
elements the inner workings or details of the system are not
necessarily present. Except for gross errors in building the
model, a system designer can probably always correct the model
saying that the system might not exactly work the way it is
modeled. The key to remember is that this model is just an
analysis/design tool for the system and is not supposed to
actually be the system. The more realistic the model is
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though the more it will tell the safety analyst about the
safety of the system.
If the model does not provide exact duplication of the
system, the model allows safety points in the system to be
readily apparent. In the case of decisions, there is a choice
to show a decision resolved by an external agent or to model
the system exactly as it would occur without giving the model
a decision (similar to hardwiring the system) . Leaving the
decision as being determined by an external agent allows the
decision point to be viewed as a critical point in the system.
All decisions points are usually also safety point
considerations
.
For the analyst the choices are not always clear-cut as to
how to model a certain part of the system. It is useful to
consider choices at an early stage of the modeling process.
At the end of the process one choice might become more
apparent to the analyst.
In proposing a methodology it is difficult to remove the
subjectivity portion of the modeling experience. Three
different analysts might construct three slightly different
models. This chapter has provided a methodology to follow
which discusses the elements of Petri net modeling and the
issues concerned with safety modeling. It is unrealistic for
the analyst to believe that by following this methodology and
performing the subsequent analysis, discussed in the next
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chapter, that this will provide a perfectly safe system.
Petri net modeling is only a design/analysis tool to help
construct a safer system.
E. SUMMARY OF MODELING METHODOLOGY
In this chapter, a methodology has been proposed to
construct a Petri net model for software safety analysis.
Petri nets are able to model the hardware and software of a
system all in one net . The analysis performed in the next
chapter will tell whether or not this model provides adequate
information for safety analysis.
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V. ANALYSTS METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the concepts of
software safety analysis and determine if the Petri net model
constructed in the previous chapter is appropriate for safety
analysis. This chapter does not attempt to present a complete
analysis of the system, but instead examine a representative
number of problems to explain the technique and present a
conclusion on the appropriateness of the model. The analysis
technique presented and discussed in this chapter is due to
the work of Leveson and Stolzy. For more information on this
technique see [Leveson and Stolzy 1987]
.
The purpose of system safety modeling and analysis is to
show that the system is safe both if it operates as intended
and in the presence of faults. This analysis attempts to
detect hazards in the system design and discusses possible
design modifications to eliminate them.
The primary function of the software in this system is to
monitor the surrounding system and perform the safe separation
distance calculation.
The overall goal in designing a safety-critical system is
to eliminate hazards from the design or to minimize risk by
altering the design so there is a very low probability of the
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hazard occurring. According to Leveson and Stolzy [1987] in
"most realistic systems it is impossible to completely
eliminate risk. The goal instead is to design a system with
acceptable risk." To show that a system is low-risk or safe,
it is necessary to first ensure that if the specifications are
correctly implemented and no failures occur, operation of the
system will not result in a mishap. The first part of the
analysis will focus on possible hazards the system can achieve
under normal operating conditions. Second, the risk of faults
or failures leading to a mishap must be eliminated or
minimized by using fault-tolerance or fail-safe procedures.
If it is not possible to completely eliminate the possibility
of a hazard occurring, then in order to reduce risk the length
of time of occurrence of the hazardous conditions must be
minimized. [Leveson and Stolzy 1987]
In general, from a safety standpoint, the first priority
of the response to a safety-critical situation is the
reduction of risk rather than attainment of mission.
The analysis performed in this thesis does not consider
the correctness of the algorithm or the correctness of the
software or system design. This analysis is concerned with




1. Preliminary Hazard Analysis
The first step in any safety analysis is to identify
hazards and categorize them with respect to criticality and
probability (i.e. risk); this is called a preliminary hazard
analysis (PHA) . Potential hazards that need to be considered
include normal operating modes, maintenance modes, failures or
unusual accidents in the environment, and errors in human
performance. [Leveson 1986]
Hazards can be categorized by the aggregate probability
of the occurrence of the individual conditions which make up a
hazard and by the seriousness of the resulting mishap. A
mishap is an unplanned event or series of events that results
in death, injury, illness, or damage to or loss of property or
equipment. Together these constitute risk. [Leveson 1986]
A beneficial source of information on preliminary
hazards should be the system designer. The system designer
should be aware of the system safety issues, in addition to
the standards that this system must meet.
Since for safety-critical systems, safety is the
primary concern, the benefit of beginning this analysis as
early as possible in the design phase is important. A safety
analyst should be included in the preliminary design phases to
simplify the analysis process. The analyst could make an
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impact on the design of the system earlier in the process and
help save time and money.
Once hazards are identified, they are assigned a
severity and probability. Often early in the design of the
system the probabilities are unknown and the analysis is done
considering only the severity. Classification of hazard
severity is important, as to low-risk, medium-risk, or high
risk. [Leveson and Stolzy 1987]
The safety features for the design of a safety arming
device are contained in [MIL-STD-1316C] . There must be two
independent safety features; 1) to prevent unintentional
arming and 2) to provide forces to remove safety features
derived from different environments. Operation of at least
one of these safety features shall depend on sensing a
post-launch environment.
Safety features shall provide arming delay. Arming
delay shall provide safe separation distance for all defined
operational conditions. Also, an assembled fuze shall not be
capable of being armed manually.
From the PHA of the guided missile fuze safety arming
device a hazard exists:
1) if the weapon is assembled and the firing capacitor is
charged, since there is a high voltage present at the
safety arming device interface.
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2) if the firing capacitor is charged, there is the
potential for inadvertent, premature detonation, before
the safe separation distance is reached.
In general, the primary safety concern for this system is
premature or inadvertent detonation. To show the concepts of
the analysis technique, the analysis will examine several
representative samples of sequences of events and/or failures
that can result in premature or inadvertent detonation.
At this stage, the designer and analyst should discuss all
possible failures to the system that are known. The analyst
may discover more during the analysis, but if this is
discussed now it will save time when failures are inserted
into the model.
Three possible high-risk states are anlyzed in this
section:
1) Can the missile detonate without receiving a 4+G Boost
(failure condition)?
In the Petri net model, the state of the system is
represented by a collection of places each with a token.
The places are P15 (rocket motor fired, 4+G Boost not
received) , P67 (signal to fire received) , and P17




2) Can the system reach the high-risk state of P18 (ITL
signal not recieved) , P67 (signal to fire received), and
P17 (firing capacitor charged)
?
Additional problems considered, but not examined in this
thesis are:
1) Since the thermal battery can fire from electrostatic
discharge and accidently start the computer and
software, can this lead to premature detonation?
2) Can the system accidentally toggle the solenoid three
times before we have reached the safe separation
distance, allowing premature detonation?
2a) Can a problem occur if the value in the safe
separation distance lookup table is either incorrect
(possibly data destroyed) such that when the check for
safe separation distance in P70 occurs the result is
incorrect. This could lead to no detonation of the
missile, since the detonation interrupter would never be
removed?
3) Can the voltage to the solenoid be applied too long and
burn out the solenoid? The timer loop is currently 200
ticks which is five times the minimum time needed to
toggle the solenoid.
2 . Software Hazard Analysis
Once the PHA is completed, software hazard analysis can
begin. Using the hazardous states which have been identified
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in the PHA, it may be possible to work backward to the
software interface using Petri net analysis techniques such as
those described by Leveson and Stolzy [1987] to derive the
software safety requirements.
In this research, the Time Petri nets are not used, but
the traditional concept of Petri nets is used. There are
certain parts of the analysis that can be performed on untimed
or traditional Petri nets. In the methodology proposed, it is
natural to first build the untimed Petri net model, so this
analysis will focus on that first. The analyst can show that
certain states are reachable without considering timing
constraints, but when timing constraints are added, the state
might be unreachable. The addition of timing constraints is
important for safety considerations which are affected by the
timing sequence of events. In real-time systems, correct
software actions which are too early or too late can lead to
unsafe conditions. [Leveson and Stolzy 1987] In this system
any analysis concerned with whether or not the system has
reached a safe separation distance is concerned with timing
constraints
.
a. Building the Reachability Graph
To show that a system is low-risk or safe, it is
necessary to first ensure that if the specifications are
correctly implemented and no failures occur, the operation of
the system will not result in a mishap. In order for the
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analyst to determine if the system design can "reach" any
high-risk states, the analyst creates a reachability graph.
[Leveson and Stolzy 1987]
The reachability graph identifies all possible
states that the system can reach from the initial state by any
legal sequence of transition firings.
Given an initial state, the reachability set for
the Petri net is the set of states that results from executing
the Petri net. This graph will help the analyst to eliminate
high-risk hazards which have been designed into the system.
In this thesis, a reachability graph is created
where the nodes of the graph are labeled with the present
marking (i.e. the state) and the arcs represent transitions
between the states. For further information, the theory of
reachability sets is presented in Appendix I.
By using the inverse Petri net, where the input
and output functions are reversed, it can be determined if a
high risk state is reachable by using the high risk state as
the initial state and determining whether the original state
is reachable.
The analysis performed below is to check if under
normal operating conditions, the high risk state of P18 (ITL
signal not received) , P67 (signal to fire received) , and P17
(firing capacitor charged) can ever be reached.
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The reachability graph begins with the high-risk
state which consists of tokens in P18, P17, and PS?. The
graph is built by firing transitions while working backwards.
In Figure 5-1 places which do not provide any useful risk
information are dropped from the graph (i.e. P66 and P61)
.
The notation keep P62(2) represents two tokens remaining in
P62, but since this is a large loop, the tokens are consumed
in the same manner through each loop and this is not repeated
in this graph.
The backwards analysis graph depicted in Figure
5-1, shows that there is no path to the initial state from
this high risk state, so this cannot occur under normal
operating conditions. The ITL signal check by the software
inhibits this state from ever occurring under normal
operation.
This analysis works well, but generating the
entire reachability graph is a very time consuming task and
the graph is large for a system of even this size. It is
possible for the backward reachability graph to be as large as
or even larger than the original graph. The use of an
automated tool to create this graph is almost a necessity for
any real-time system and is definitely the case for this
system.
Leveson and Stolzy [1987] propose a different
technique which allows the analysis of the design without
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Figure 5-1. Backwards Reachability Graph of Detonation
without Intent to Launch
creating the entire reachability graph. Their approach is to
identify and eliminate high risk hazards that have been
designed into the system. Their technique makes the high risk
states unreachable, by eliminating the critical path to the
high risk state. This algorithm does not require construction
of the entire reachability graph, but requires the definition
of critical states.
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Using the Leveson and Stolzy technique, the states
of a reachability set are separated into two disjoint sets:
states from which it is possible to reach high-risk and
possibly also low-risk states and those from which it is
possible to reach only low risk states.
definition : A state (marking) |I^ is a critical state if and
only if:
a) [l^ e low-risk states and
b) there exist two nonempty sequences of transitions s^ and S2
and two markings |lj^ and |J.j such that 5 (|I^, si) =|lj_ and
5 (|I^, s2) =|J.^, where |J,j_e high-risk states and M^-j e low-risk
states
.
If a high risk state is reachable, then there must be
a critical state on the path from the initial state to the high
risk state (this includes the possibility that the critical
state is the initial state) . The approach is thus to define all
the hazardous states of the system and eliminate the path to
them, by creating an alternate low-risk path.
To ensure that high-risk states can never be reached,
it is possible simply to work backward to the first critical
state (i.e. to a state in the reachability graph that has two
successors) and to use design techniques such as interlocks to
ensure that the high-risk path is never taken.
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A critical state is a state from which a low-risk
state is reachable by a transition and a high-risk state is
reachable by a transition. To eliminate the critical path which
proceeds through this state, it is necessary to guarantee the
system takes the low-risk path and not the high-risk path. The
high-risk path can either immediately or potentially lead to a
hazardous state.
"Using the backward technique to determine if a high
risk state is reachable is useful when the goal of the analysis
is to prove only that the system cannot reach certain hazardous
states. The backward approach is practical only if one considers
a relatively small number of high risk states." [Leveson and
Stolzy 1987] In most real time systems, however, the number of
truly high risk states should be a manageable level. If this is
not the case, then it is worthwhile to produce the complete
reachability graph.
The disadvantage of this technique is that it is
conservative, in that the analyst may define a larger number of
critical states than are actually needed. To reduce the large
amount of computing to produce the entire reachability graph,
critical paths are defined, which might not have been defined if
the entire reachability graph for each hazardous state was
created. [Leveson and Stolzy 1987] Since the entire graph is not
created, this approach is a short cut, but at the same time
could lead to more design changes than might be necessary.
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According to Leveson and Stolzy [1987], "eliminating
a nonexistent path may have the effect of eliminating or
lessening the possibility of mishaps caused by run-time faults
and failures." Using the algorithm, if an uneliminated path
also leads to a mishap, this will be determined in a later step
and the this path will also be eliminated.
The complete algorithm of Leveson and Stolzy [1987]
is in Appendix J. The algorithm starts with the set of
high-risk conditions. "For each member of this set, the
immediately prior state or states are generated. Each of these
"one-step-backward" states is then examined to see if it is a
potentially critical state and can be used to eliminate one path
to the high risk state. Note that the algorithm starts with
partial states and not complete states. That is, some conditions
in the state are unimportant as far as risk is concerned, and
thus it is not known at the beginning of the algorithm the
complete composition of the reachable high-risk states (the
complete states from which to start the backward analysis) . The
don't care places in each state are "filled in" with those
conditions that are possible in the process of executing the
algorithm. Finally, the analyst only needs to look forward one
step from each potentially critical state in order to label it
as critical (i.e. there exists a next-state that is low risk)
.
This is because if this path also leads to a high risk state,
then it will be eliminated by the algorithm in a later step."
77
To show a comparison between the two methods, the
first- problem from the list is examined. Can premature
detonation occur with missile released from the rack and
without the occurrence of a 4+G Boost.
Under normal operating conditions this could not
occur, because of the timing constraints, but due to a
failure, the analysis will show if it is reachable. Even
though this net is untimed, the time for the 4+G Boost is
definitely less than the time needed to calculate the safe
separation distance under normal operations.
Before the problem is analyzed, the concept of
inserting failures must be discussed. In the Leveson and
Stolzy method a fault is represented by a failure transition,
which acts like other transitions but is denoted by a double
bar and a fault condition which is denoted by a double circle,
shown in Figure 5-2
.
In this thesis we are concerned only with
determination of which failures can potentially lead to a
hazardous state, that was unreachable without failure.
Leveson and Stolzy [1987] propose methods for making a system
fail-safe or fault-tolerant. A further discusssion of
failures inserted into the system is discussed in section D of
this chapter.
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a) Desired event tl doesn't occur; b)
event tl occurs
Undesired
The high risk state is P15 (rocket motor just
fired, but no 4+G Boost), P17 (firing capacitor charged), P67
(signal to fire recieved) , P12 (missile on the rack) . Figure
5-3 shows the insertion of a failure into the net. This
failure causes the removal of the token from this place,
causing the next transition not to occur (4+ G Boost) . The
failure represents the rocket motor not firing or if the





Figure 5-3. 4+G Boost failure in place 15
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The backwards reachability graph for this high risk
state was constructed and is shown in Figure 5-4. The graph,
starts from the hazardous state and works backward to show
that the initial state PO is reachable if this failure occurs.
Figure 5-5 shows the critical state definition
method as proposed by Leveson and Stolzy [1987] . Notice that
two critical states have been defined. In the next section a
method will be shown that eliminates this bad (critical) path
from the design. The critical transition is t64 (detonation)
which must occur prior to til for the system to work normally.
C. SYSTEM DESIGN MODIFICATIONS
The modification methods discussed in this section modify
the current model and subsequently the design. The model is
just a tool to show the result and aid in the analysis. The
decision as to whether the modification should be made in
hardware or software should be made by the designer.
To eliminate the high-risk path from the design in the
previous example, it is necessary to modify the Petri net in
some way to ensure that the safe path is always taken, i.e.,
that another transition is always performed before or has
precedence over the critical transition. [Leveson and Stolzy
1987]
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Figure 5-4 . Backwards Reachability Graph for 4+G Boost Failure
81
critical state critical state
pl4pl5p8p67 / V...^2l4pl5pl7p65p66
til / \ t8 t63
pl4pl6pl7p65p66
low-risk State high-risk state low-risk state
Figure 5-5. Critical State Method for 4+G Boost Problem
There are many ways to modify the system design in order
to eliminate the high-risks states. This may lead to
permanent patches of the design or it may require a redesign
of a section of the system. One common approach is to use an
interlock. Figure 5-6. Interlocks are used to ensure correct
sequences of events. To model an interlock in a Petri net,
assume that t2 is the desired transition, while t^ is the
undesired transition. It is possible to force the system to
always take the desired path by making the following changes
to the two transitions in the net. The approach is to add a
new place (the interlock I) to the output bag of t2 and to the
input bag of tj.. This ensures that transition t2 always has
precedence over t^,
If an interlock were used in this example it would
connect transition til (4+G Boost) to t64 (Detonation)
,




of the missile. This is shown in Figure 5-7. This design
modification could be implemented as a 4+G Boost check in the
software somewhere after the check for Intent to Launch. To
provide a system that is fail-safe or fault-tolerant the
system designer will have to decide what mechanism to add to
4+G Boost
Figure 5-7. Interlock to modify 4+G Boost design
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provide fault-tolerance or a fail-safe system. [Leveson and
Stolzy 1987] have proposed a technique for providing a
fault-tolerant or fail-safe system.
Since premature or unsafe detonation is the primary
concern of this system, most of the interlocks will connect
with the critical transition t64 thus attempting to prevent
premature detonation.
In this example, creating the backwards reachability
graph showed that with a failure the hazardous state in
question was reachable. By performing the algorithm proposed
by Leveson and Stolzy this high-risk path could have been
realized and avoided sooner.
Another type of locking mechanism. Figure 5-8, ensures
that an event does not occur while another condition is true.
This is implemented in the Petri net by using a locking place.
With a token initially in the place L (lock) only one
transition (either tl or t2) can be enabled. For this example
say tl is enabled and fires to place the token in P2, enabling
t3. Only after t3 fires can t2 be enabled, thus allowing tl
or t2 to be enabled. This corresponds to a critical section in
software, which is also shown in the mutual exclusion net






Figure 5-8. Locking Mechanism
Another way to ensure that one transition will always
fire when both are enabled is to enforce timing constraints or
timing conditions in the designed system. To ensure that tj
does not fire when t^ and tj are both enabled, the following
timing constraint must be enforced: the maximum time that it
may take for the desired transition (tj_) to fire must be less
than the minimum time for the other transition (tj) to become
enabled and to fire. Each of these time quantities must be
the total time that the enabling conditions have been met, not
just the individual transition time limit. [Leveson and Stolzy
1987]
One method to determine these times is to use the
reachability graph to find the maximum (or minimum) valued
path leading to the transition that is continually enabled.
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Timing constraints are enforced in systems by either
verifying that the design makes it impossible for the
constraint to be violated or by using a watchdog timers and
other devices to determine when the constraint is about to
fail and to insert recovery techniques (either hardware or
software) into the system design, [Leveson and Stolzy 1987]
These procedures only identify possible ways to modify
the design to make it safer. The actual interlocks and timers
that are used must be considered from an engineering
feasibility and cost standpoint. If the design is found to
involve many hazards, a complete redesign may be preferrable
to patching the original design. [Leveson and Stolzy 1987]
D. ADDING FAILURES TO THE ANALYSIS
In an embedded system control usually cannot be abandoned
abruptly, therefore, responses to hardware failures, software
faults, human error, and undesired and perhaps unexpected
environmental conditions must be built into the system.
According to Leveson and Stolzy [1987], these responses can
take three basic forms:
1) a fault tolerant system continues to provide full
performance and functional capabilities in the presence
of operational faults.
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2) a fail-soft system continues operation but provides only
degraded performance or reduced functional capabilities
until the fault is removed.
3) a fail-safe system attempts to limit the amount of
damage caused by failure. No attempt is made to satisfy
the functional specifications except where necessary to
ensure safety.
These responses are basically in the order of decreasing
desirability although the functional and safety requirements
of the system are not identical, they are not necessarily of
decreasing importance [Leveson and Stolzy 1987] .
To prove the safety of a complex system in the presence
of faults, it is necessary to show that no single fault can
cause a hazardous effect and that hazards resulting from
sequences of failures are sufficiently remote. The latter
approaches the impossible if an attempt is made to combine all
possible failures in all possible sequences and to analyze the
output. Instead, procedures start by defining what is
hazardous and then working backward to find all combinations
of faults that produce the event. [Leveson and Stolzy 1987].
Having reduced the risk of the system to an acceptable
level, to continue the analysis it is necessary to consider
run-time faults and failures. Designing for fault tolerance
and safety requires being able to model failures and faults
and to analyze the resulting model. Using definitions from
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Kopetz [1982], a failure is defined as an event while a fault
is a state. A failure always results in a fault and is called
a fault-starting event. The fault remains in the system until
a terminating event occurs for the fault. Control failures
are the only failures we are concerned with.
According to Leveson and Stolzy [1987], control failures
include
:
1) a required event that does not occur
2) an undesired event
3) an incorrect sequence of required events
4) two incompatible events occurring simultaneously
5) timing failures in event sequences
When dealing with analysis of failures in general
situations, it is useful to be able to determine the state
that a system is in after the failure has occurred. A fault
remains in the system until a terminating event for the fault
(the faulty condition is no longer true or loses its token)
.
Because of the faulty state or condition, it is possible for
further failures to occur that cause further faults.
With failure insertion, we can insert a failure at
almost any conceivable place in the model. A realistic failure
condition must be considered when determining failures at
places. For more information on techniques to ensure
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fail-safe or fault-tolerant operation see [Leveson and Stolzy
1987]
.
E. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS RESULTS
The results of this analysis shows that the software in
this system and in systems in general must monitor the system
environment better.
From the analysis and from discussions with the designer
of the system, three improvements to the system are apparent.
1) Need to verify 4+G level, before continuing to
detonation
2) Add telemetry data about the state of the device, in its
toggle phases. This check could be done every 1,000
feet.
3) Add a watchdog monitor to address all critical timing
constraints.
4) Before stopping the software make sure the software is
no longer needed for monitoring.
In order to perform a thorough analysis, the analyst
needs to be aware of all types of potential failures,
mechanical, computer hardware and software.
E. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
The situations that were examined in this chapter show
that the techniques and concepts presented here and by Leveson
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and Stolzy [1987] are appropriate for software safety
analysis. Untimed Petri nets are able to provide adequate
information to show certain types of analysis and Timed Petri
nets could provide additional timing information in time
critical systems.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
This thesis has proposed a methodology for modeling a
real-time system for the purpose of software safety analysis.
This thesis shows that Petri net modeling is sufficient for
performing this type of analysis. Petri net modeling allows the
analyst to focus on the essentials of the system in regard to
software safety without worrying about unecessary details.
This modeling method provides a realistic abstraction of
actual features of the real-time system.
This methodolgy is not a substitute for a well-trained
analyst. The translation from the design documentation to the
Petri net model can be automated in addition to automated
tools to assist in the analysis, but an expert analyst will
always be needed. If a safety hazard is left out or not
considered in the analysis the system is potentially unsafe.
Any amount of automation of this process will not point out
safety design problems by itself. The technique proposed,
given the hazardous conditions, can be used to see if these
can occur and if they do, either remove them or limit their
effect.
The construction of the model and analysis does not
attempt to address the issue of the correctness of the
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software or the correctness of the design, but it does allow
analysis of the existing design.
This tool and methodology is in its infancy. With
increased interest this design/analysis tool can at least
begin to approach questions of software safety.
In conjunction with the work performed by Leveson,
hopefully this work can provide the springboard to show that
the field of software safety is an approachable field. A
benefit of this research is it provides an incentive for
people to begin using this type of tool in their own
applications and to further this area of research.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Since this field is at a beginning period, more work is
needed to develop automated tools to build the Petri net model
and automated tools to perform some of the analysis. An
automated tool which can aid the creation of a net and allow
queries for unsafe states would provide immeasurable time
savings. This might provide an ability to question graphs and
perform traces. Without the presence of automated tools this
type of analysis would be impractical to perform on even a
small system.
One of the concerns is that when this type of work is
scaled-up the amount of time or effort will not be
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proportional to the time and effort of this size project.
This question cannot yet be answered, but further research is
needed to answer that question.
Since the analysis in this thesis did not use Time Petri
nets, an application of Time Petri nets would be important to
determine the effect of this methodology. The addition of
timing constraints will clearly increase the level of the
analysis of the system analyzed in this thesis.
This thesis has primarily focused on the creation of the
Petri net model in order to evaluate the concepts necessary
for the analysis. To provide a final design for the safety
arming device, a full-scale analysis would need to be
performed.
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APPENDIX A SOFTWARE CODE LISTING
* CURRENT SAFE SEPARATION SENSOR DESIGN *
* PORT ASSIGNMENTS *
Port (bus) is the ADC input
Port 1 is the control port
bits 0,1 ADC Control
bit 2 display control * not used *
bits 3,4,5,6 solenoid control
bit 7 switch input (ITL)
Port 2 is the display output * not used *
































LOWER SEP. DISTANCE BYTE
UPPER SEP. DISTANCE BYTE
ESfmAL ACCELERATION
LOWER ADDRESS OF LOOK-UP TABLE












GOTO MEMORY LOC 00
* INITIALIZE PI *
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* LOAD LOW LOOK-UP TABLE ADDRESS *




* CHECK SWITCH SUBROUTINE *
READ PORT 1 DATA INTO ACCUMULATOR
JUMP IF BIT 7 NOT ZERO (SWITCH ON)
CALL ADC READ SUBR
* UPDATE INITIAL ACCELERATION, TWO'S *
* COMPLEMENT FORMAT *
4c 4c
CHECK AGAIN FOR SWITCH 'ON'
* FIRED SUBROUTINE *
CALL ADC READ SUBR










































UPDATE CURRENT SEP. DISTANCE
JUMP IF CARRY ON SEP. DISTANCE
CALL TIME DELAY SUBR
COMPARE SEP. DISTANCE W/LOOKUP
JUMP IF TOGGLE NOT REQUIRED
JUMP TO TOGGLE SUBR
* READ ADC SUBROUTINE *
ENABLE ADC
LOAD ACCELERATION ONTO BUS
INPUT CURRENT ACCELERATION
DISABLE ADC
RETURN TO CALLING PROGRAM
* TOGGLE SOLENOID SUBROUTINE *
LOAD SOLENOID STATUS INTO ACC
TOGGLE BIT OF SOLENOID STATUS
INCREMENT LOOK-UP TABLE POINTER
* *
* TOGGLE SOLENOID ACCORDING TO BIT 0*
* OF SOLENOID STATUS *
* *
* LOAD AND START TIMER, WAIT FOR *
* SOLENOID TO TOGGLE *




























CHECK LOOK-UP TABLE, JUMP IF *
LAST VALUE HAS NOT BEEN EXCEEDED *
;ii( 3k^ iic 4c :|c ;(c 4c :ic^%% 4c :ic%% ;jc :{c i|e 4c ;^ :ic :ic% :fc^ :{c ;ic :fc ;ic% 9|c 4c :ic 4(^* 4c%% 9|c
* WATT FOR SWTTCH OFF SUBROUTINE *
* WATT FOR SWTTCH TO BE TURNED OFF, *
* POSSIBLE RESTART OF PROGRAM *
4c
* TIMER CONTROL SUBROUTINE *
LOAD STARTING TIME
START TIMER
WATT FOR TIMER TO COMPLETE
STOP TIMER
RETURN TO CALLING PROGRAM
* TIME DELAY SUBROUTINE *
LOAD STARTING TIME INTO ACC
DECREMENT ACC
IF WAIT COMPLETE, RETURN
CALL TIME DELAY SUBR
RESTART TIMER
RETURN TO CALLING PROGRAM
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APPENDIX I REACHABILITY THEORY
The state of a Petri net is defined by its markings. The
change in state caused by firing a transition is defined
by the next-state function 5.
definition
:
The next state function 5: N^ X T —» N^ for a
Petri net 0= (P, T, 1,0, |Iq) with marking |J. and transition tj g T
is defined if and only if tj is enabled.
If 5(}J,,tj) is defined, then 5(|l,tj) = |J,' where
H' (Pi) =^l(Pi) - #(pi,I(tj)) + #(pi,0(tj)) for all Pi G P.
Given an initial state, the reachability set for the
Petri net is the set of states that results from executing the
Petri net.
Given a transition sequence and |J.q (initial mark)
,
we can easily derive the marking sequence for the execution of
the Petri net. In a marking ^l, a set of transitions will be
enabled and may fire. The result of firing a transition in a
marking |i is a new marking |X'.
We say |I ' is immediately reachable from|l; that is we can
immediately get to state }!' from state |I.
definition a marking }I ' is immediately reachable from p. if
there exists a transition tj g T such that 5 (|l,t j) = |Ll '
.
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The reachability relationship is the reflexive
transitive closure of the immediately reachable relationship
Thus if |I' is immediately reachable from [i, and ji.'' is
immediately reachable from [i', then |l' is reachable from }lo
definition: The reachability set R(0,|l) for a Petri net =
(P,T, I,0,|Iq) with marking m is the smallest of markings
defined by:
1) ^le R(F,^l)




APPENDIX J CRITICAL STATE DETERMINATION ALGORITHM
The following is the critical state determination
algorithm as proposed by [Leveson and Stolzy 1987]
:
Put initial set of high-risk conditions into S = states_to_process
while S is not empty
do
let c be one of S;
if c is a subset of the initial state then
high-risk state reachable and need to redesign
else
do { work backwards to critical states }
next_back_states = (j)
for each transition t e T {determine which transitions are
enabled}
do
let R = (t) n c;
if R ;* (|) then {t is enabled, generate the corresponding
next backward states}
Next_back_states = Next_back_states u 5~^ (R u (0{t) -
R)u (c - R) ,t) ;
od
for each next_back_state b
do
forward_state3 = ^




let R = l(t) n b;
if R ^(j) then {t is enabled, generate the
corresponding forward states }
forward_states = forward_states u 5 (R u (I(t) -R)
U (b - R),t);
od
Other_states = Forward_states - [Forward_states n
(S u Next_back_states) ]
case b
b G states_considered: exit;
b is illegal according to system invariants: exit;
b is high risk and there exists f€ Other_states such
that f is low-risk {therefore b is potentially
critical}: add b to set of critical states;
else {b is low-risk but not critical-necessary to go
backwards again}
add b to S;
esac
od
move c from S to states_considered;
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